Spacio-cide and bio-politics
Israeli colonial project
Sari Hanafi
Since the Zionist myth of a land without people for a people without land,1 the policy of successive Israeli governments has been to appropriate land while ignoring the people on it.2 The founding myth has been perpetuated, and, in its more modern form, can be seen in the policy of acquiring the most land with the least people (where "people," of course, refer to the Palestinians).3 The resulting institutionalized invisibility of the Palestinian people both feeds and is being fed by Israel's everyday colonial practices. For example, parts of the Israeli West Bank wall are being constructed specifically to remove the visual presence of Palestinian villages. Moreover, this enforced invisibility sustains an Israeli system neither interested in killing nor in assimilating the Palestinians. Asking the Palestinians of Israel to be loyal to the State of Israel has never brought with it the prize of equal citizenship; while the Israeli narrative sees Jerusalem as its "eternal unified capital," it does not try to assimilate the quarter of a million of Palestinians of the city.
The Israeli left as well the right employ what it could be called bio-politics to instrumentalize Palestinians using the most sophisticated anthropological tools to divide them into categories,4 as well as the state of exception for the one objective of appropriating more land. This article will argue that the Israeli state of exception should be understood as a permanent structure of juridical-political de-localization and dislocation aimed at transferring the Palestinian population whether internally or outside of fluid state borders. Otherwise, what I will argue here is that the Israeli colonial project is "spacio-cidal" (as opposed to genocidal) in that it targets land for the purpose of rendering inevitable the "voluntary" transfer of the Palestinian population primarily by targeting the space upon which the Palestinian people live. This becomes possible by deploying bio-politics to categorize Palestinians into different "states of exception" that render them powerless. In such a context, the return of refugees becomes the very point at which the entire colonial aspect of Zionism is undermined.

I. The spacio-cide of Palestine

Compared to other colonial and ethnic conflicts (Serbian-Bosnian, Rwanda etc.), the 1948 war did not, relatively speaking, produce a lot of casualties. The notion of "nakba" is based on losing land and refugeehood rather than the loss of life. Even after three years of the Intifada the number of victims is still relatively low,5 compared to the six weeks of massacre in Rwanda in which some 800,000 people were killed.
The Israeli colonial project is not a genocidal project but a "spacio-cidal" one. In every conflict, belligerents define their enemy and shape their mode of action accordingly. In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Israeli target is the place.6 Different reports produced by the Jerusalem Emergency Committee, a committee set up by Jerusalem-based NGOs after the April 2002 Israeli invasion, show a systematic destruction of public places: all Palestinian ministries bar two and 65 NGOs were totally or partially destroyed. What was striking about this was not the confiscations but the vandalism. To steal documents and computer hard drives from the Ministry of Education can be "understood" within the framework of the culturalistic and orientalistic vision a military apparatus looking for information to prove that the Palestinian education system "produced incitement and suicide bombers," but why did soldiers also smash the computer screens and destroy the furniture?7 During the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the architect Bogdan Bogdanovich coined the term "urbicide" to describe the destruction of cities in the Balkans. Serbian nationalism romanticized rural villages where a single community spirit predominated. The city in this context was a symbol of the multiplicity of communities and cultures, the antithesis of the Serbian ideal. In the Palestinian occupied territories the entire landscape has been targeted. The major tools are the bulldozers that have destroyed streets, houses, private cars, and dunam upon dunam of olive trees. It is a war in an age of literal agoraphobia, the fear of space as developed by Christian Salmon (2002), seeking not the division of territory but its abolition. A trail of devastation stretches as far as the eye can see: a jumble of demolished buildings, leveled hillsides and flattened forests. This barrage of concentrated damage has been wrought not only by the bombs and tanks of traditional warfare, but by industrious, vigorous destruction that has toppled properties like a violent tax assessor (Salmon, 2002). It is "spacio-cide," not urbicide. It is more holistic, incorporating "socio-cide" (targeting the Palestinian society as whole and its social ties between its members),8 "economo-cide" (hindering the mobility of people and goods) and "politi-cide" (destroying PNA institutions and other embodiments of national aspirations).9 The climax so far was the destruction of a third of the area of the Jenin refugee camp. 10 The Israeli project during this Intifada has as its objective to make a kind of "demographic transfer" or what one Israeli minister has called a "voluntary transfer" of the Palestinian population by transforming the Palestinian topos to atopia, turning territory into mere land. It is by the means of spacio-cide that Israel is preparing such a population transfer, and already, since the beginning of the Intifada, around 100,000 Palestinians have left the country, some 3.3 percent of the Palestinian population in West Bank and Gaza (Hanafi, forthcoming). People have been forced to leave internally as well. In Hebron, for instance, some 5,000 people (850 families) have quit the old city to neighboring villages because of Jewish settler activity in the old city and the Israeli army-imposed curfew. House demolitions form another tactic to effect this transfer. From the beginning of the current Intifada in September 2000 until April 30, 2003, a total of 12,737 people have seen their 1,134 homes demolished in Gaza and the West Bank.11 The number has since risen significantly. This destruction has mainly occurred in Rafah, Jenin, Nablus, Hebron and Jerusalem, and the new refugees these demolitions have produced are almost all already refugees from 1948 or 1967.12 The transfer is also effected when people become "de-naturalized" as in the case of the 200,000 Palestinians who have found themselves behind the Israel's West Bank barrier and are now a part of neither Palestinian nor Israeli space: de facto stateless and space-less. This "spacio-cide" has been rendered possible by the division of the Palestinian Territories into A, B, B-, B+, C, H1, H2. In such a scheme, Palestinian national infrastructure development became almost totally impossible, not only due to the fragmentation of the space, but also because of the fragmentation of the Palestinian political system. The PNA cannot for instance implement water reservoir projects for a set of villages if the pipeline passes through Zone C. The road between Bethlehem and Hebron was stopped in 1999 because no Israel authorization was granted to pass through Zone C. There was urban development in zones A and B, but these are always surrounded by Israeli zones, hindering any possible urban expansion for either industrial or residential purposes. In addition, unwilling or unable to pressure Israel, the international community's various agencies have been reluctant to negotiate with the Israeli authority concerning funding projects in Jerusalem or areas in zone C (Hanafi and Tabar, 2004).

The characteristics of spacio-cide

There are many characteristics to the Israeli project of the spcio-cide.First, the spacio-cide is a strategic colonial ideology applied in Palestine/Israel independently of the peace-process. Even after the signing of the Oslo Accords, the number of settlers increased three-fold (from 120,000 to 430,000) and the area of settlements doubled. After the signing of the Hebron Protocol in 1997, through the promulgation of six military orders, Israel stopped the work of 416 workers who were restoring Hebron's Old City (Vitullo, 2003). The World Zionist Organization (WZO) meanwhile keeps drawing plans to conquer more land. For instance, the WZO between 1983 and 1986 prepared a regional plan suggesting an extension of the network of settlement bypass roads based on four principles: integration between the road network in Israel and in the West Bank; increasing the land allocated to the settlements; connecting the Jewish settlements with each other while separately connecting the "Arab colonies" (Benvenisti, 1984). These plans have very much been followed in the development of the settlement infrastructure since. The second characteristic of spacio-cide is to deny and ignore the demographic development of the Palestinian community. No studies have been undertaken by Israel to provide reliable demographic information concerning the Palestinian population in the Palestinian territories. The only solid demographic studies that have been undertaken are by Israeli anthropologists working on the hamoula (tribe) system for surveillance and disciplinary power. In 1981, the Israeli Central Planning Department of the Israeli Army commissioned an Israeli consultant, Shamshoni, to prepare a plan of 183 villages. The plans he came up with were not based on any survey but on information collected by the mukhtars (heads of villages) (Coon, 1991: 94).13
Third, the spacio-cide has been justified not just on political and security grounds but also through the humanities and especially the gender fields. Tamara Neuman examined maternalism as practice and rhetoric for settlers, focusing on women's attempts during the 1970s to expand the settlement of Kiryat Arba, and on the persuasiveness of the issue of motherhood in subsequent representations of these and other contemporary events. The primary expansions into municipal Hebron include incursions into the "Tomb of the Patriarchs," the establishment of a Jewish cemetery, and the takeover of the Dabouya building. In these diverse contexts, Neuman argued, the role of maternalism in settlement expansion depends on a strategic use of the private sphere, which neutralizes the political content of women's actions (2004:2).
The forth characteristic of the spacio-cide is its three-dimensional nature, as Eyal Weizman elaborated in his chief book the on the Civil Occupation and his paper on "Politics of Verticality". Al Najafi and Kastner noted, the geometry of the occupation can only be apprehended in three dimensions. There are unsettled questions regarding the underground sewage, archaeology, tunnels, water reservoirs, the air space, and so on. These surface complications (it's no longer possible to draw a continuous line that separates Palestinians from Israelis) made clear to the negotiating parties during the Oslo process that a two-dimensional solution is no longer possible. The Israeli proposal was to give the Palestinians limited sovereignty on the land but to retain Israeli sovereignty of the subsoil and the airspace. In other words we have a kind of sovereignty sandwich - Israel, Palestine, Israel - across the vertical dimension. Peace technicians (the people who are always drawing new maps for a solution) arrive at completely insane proposals for solving the problem of international boundaries in three dimensions (Najafi and Kastner, 2002).
The fifth characteristic of the spacio-cide is that it is not shaping only the place but also the borders. Israeli colonial practices entail a continuous drawing of the borders thus creating a new type of frontier: portable, porous and hazy, a border in motion. The border designates two spaces that are completely different: Palestinian space and settlement space. The Israeli occupation determines what will be illuminated and what will be cast into darkness, what will be rendered visible or invisible, accessible or inaccessible (Salmon, 2002).
Finally, the sixth characteristic of the spacio-cide is that it aims to transform the Palestinian Territories to mere Bantustans, or non-contiguous enclaves -- or even in the words of Adi Ophir and Ariella Azoulay 14 -- camps. It is very interesting to note that in August 2004, the IDF presented to World Bank a plan of new routes, bridges and tunnels to be constructed to be utilized by the Palestinians, requesting the financing of the infrastructure for that. Thus Israel is not any more committed to provide the Palestinian state with territorial contiguity but a 'pseudo-state' with transportation contiguity.
We are here looking at spacio-cide at a macro political level, but certainly researchers should in future illustrate how this planning functions at a micro level, e.g. the interaction of the colonizer and the colonized or how the social actor resists this planning and transgresses the power structure. On the macro political level, we must now ask which mechanisms were used by Israel to impose its colonial order and how this order interacted with the international community (the donor communities and international organizations). We will also look at how this territorial project shapes the actor and the subject.

The Wall as ultimatum form
of Specio-cide


In a non-colonial nation-state, Georgio Agamben describes the sovereignty of nation-state as an exercise of state of exception. But what one feel while visiting the wall of Apartheid around Jerusalem to which extent in this state of the exception can go far with its incredible bizarre and dystopian solutions. The wall is destroying the landscape and the Palestinian human life and makes any political solution in terms of one state or two state solutions impossible. It is not only a physical barrier but a psychological, functional, socio-cultural and geo-political barrier. (Khamaisi, 2004) Contrary to the image of Israel who strategized every thing, we see how much the Israeli military establishment create problems not only to the Palestinian society but also to the Israeli society without a vision of solving the conflict, what is called in French (fuite en avant). Even if the wall is presented as a security solution, it hides the development of a settler society which has the image of the certain semi-American bourgeois dream which their quarters are controlled by watch tours. In fact, it is an American company who provide the conception of the wall with its tours and electric system.

II. Colonial bio-power, bare life and state of exception

How the spacio-cide become possible in Palestinian occupied territories? I argue here that there is new forms of sovereignty in the colonial governance which can be apprehend, from one side, at the point where bio-politics and "bare life" meet, and in the other side as extensive use of the state of exception. The sovereign power according to Agamben routinely distinguishes between those who are to be admitted to 'political life' and those who are to be excluded as the mute bearers of 'bare life'. It is a process of categorizing people and bodies in order to manage, control and surveillance them and in reducing them to a 'bare life', life which refers to body's mere 'vegetative' being, separated from the particular qualities, the social, political and historical attributes that constitute individual subjectivity. This means that we should identify mechanisms by which the state is able to insert itself into citizen/colonized bodies as a measure of sovereign power, enacting specific forms of violence by the rule of the exception through which sovereign power is defined, turning all life and all political battles into battles, again, over bare life. These new forms of sovereignty are apparent in the way colonial power manages bodies according to colonial and humanitarian categories. Developing an exploration of bio-power begun by Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben shows how sovereignty carries with it a "power over life" by the rule of the exception, being both above the law, as its constituting force, and also the safeguard of the law in its deployment. 15 There are two models of power for Agamben, a juridical one focused on the problem of the legitimacy of Western power (the problem of sovereignty), and a non-juridical model centered on the problem of the effectiveness of Western power. These two models meet in the dimension of exception. The sovereign, according to the German philosopher Carl Schmitt, is the one who may proclaim the state of exception. He is not characterized by the order that he institutes through the constitution but by the suspension of this order. This temporary suspension becomes a new and stable spatial arrangement inhabited by that naked life increasingly cannot be inscribed into the order. The sovereign has the right to suspend the validity of law, a right that of course is not inscribed in the constitution. (Bras, forthcoming). Foucault contested the traditional approach to the problem of power, which was exclusively based on juridical models ("what legitimizes power?") or institutional models ("what is the state?"). He stressed the passage from the "territorial state" to a "state of its population" and the resulting increase in importance of the nation's health and biological life as a problem of sovereign power (Foucault, 1994). This growing inclusion of man's natural life in the mechanisms and calculations of power becomes for the first time in history the possibility that power protects the life and authorizes holocaust. (Agamben, 1998: 3) In this view of sovereignty, populations are purely objective matter to be administered, rather than potential subjects of historical or social action. This does not mean the subject cannot emerge and resist this sovereignty, but that sovereignty attempts to reduce the subjective trajectories of individuals to bodies (Pandolfi, 2002). Such indistinct, displaced, localized and colonialized bodies come to be classified and defined as refugees, the stateless, inhabitants of zone A, B, B-, B+, C, H1, H2 (Oslo categories), inhabitants of zones in front of Israel's West Bank Wall, behind it, potential terrorists (categories post-September 11), etc. Populations are thus assigned different statuses as legal subjects; individual lives are suspended in an ontological no-man's land. (Butler, 2000: 81) The objective of this classification is primarily to exclude 16 and render possible the spacio-cidal project. The political project of the Palestinian people (or the political people to talk as Gérard Bras) is thus transformed as differently categorized populations become antagonists pursuing their own particular interests vis-à-vis the conflict and its potential resolution: it is in the interest of the Palestinian population of Jerusalem to stay outside the Palestinian national project as Israel transforms it into a coalition of bantustans; the geographical fragmentation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip creates two distinct entities with two different populations animated by their own stereotypes and power struggles. This process became possible as the exercise of the sovereign power (as actuality but also as potentiality) is not only creating zones of indistinction between the inside and outside (of the nation, town, or the home), but is also penetrating the whole political/social field, transforming the entire social space into a dislocated bio-political space in which modern political categories (e.g. Islamist/nationalist, right/left, private/public, absolutist/democratic) are entering into a post-political zone of indistinction and dissolution (Agamben, 1998: 4) But sovereignty does not work merely according to the logic of one-way exclusion. Palestinians are excluded from having recourse to the law but remain subject to it. Their lives are thus strictly regulated and restricted by Israeli laws and military orders which apply even to the private sphere: marriage, for instance, is subject to many restrictive laws. Palestinians from Israel can no longer get married to their counterparts in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with the Israeli high court ruling legalizing a 2003 government order not to allow the family reunification of such couples. The case of the Palestinians of Jerusalem is the archetype of the game of exclusion/inclusion. They are included (by the Israeli act of annexing and proclaiming a unified Jerusalem) while being excluded (they receive few services; there is no master plan for construction; the city is effectively segregated). They are excluded from having citizenship while being included as Jerusalem ID holders.
The international community's inability to see Israel as a constitutional colonial state comes from the fact that its practice regulating the "white" majority living in a "normal" zone (the Jewish population inside the Green line) overshadows its practices for the minority living in the state of exception: the Palestinians of Israel; the Palestinians of Jerusalem; the Palestinians of the different zones of the occupied territories; the refugees inside the camps and outside. With these categorizations, which correspond to different regimes of exception, Israel is able to restrict residential construction in East Jerusalem and then "legally" destroy housing built without permits.17 With the same state of exception, residential construction for the Palestinians of the different zones in the occupied territories is constrained. Military order 418, "Order for the Planning of Towns, Villages and Buildings (Judea and Samaria)," outlines the requirements to obtain construction permits. One of the last articles (no 7) called "special powers," gives the High Planning Council the power to "amend, cancel or suspend for a specified period the validity of any plan or permit; to assume the powers allocated to any of the committees mentioned in article 2 and 5; to grant any permit which any of the committees mentioned in article 2 and 5 are empowered to grant, or amend or cancel a permit; to dispense with the need for any permit which the Law may require." (Coon, 1991:280) In other words, the sovereign can use these exceptions to cancel the very order that was promulgated to regulate the construction permit. This is a regime of exception that renders conceivable the idea according to which passage to action is possible in certain "legal" circumstances to the extent that one can even be killed without the mediation of the courts or judges. In this way we can say that the Palestinian is a homo sacer: one who may be killed without due process and without the killer being punished (Agamben, 1997). The very frequent extra-judicial killings committed by Israel18 is possible since Israel constitute exercises its sovereignty in a manner in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide or without celebrating a sacrifice. This is killing which is neither capital punishment nor sacrifice but simply the actualization of a "capacity to be killed" inherent in the condition of the colonized people i.e. the Palestinians.
The international community, with its silence and/or timid protestations, by default encourages Israel to continue in this direction.19 During an invasion of a Palestinian town, the Israeli occupation forces declare it a military zone prohibited for foreigners and journalists. In the regime of exception, it is important to keep the exception invisible and to hinder the media from witnessing the exception. For that reason, at one time or another, almost all Palestinian cities and especially refugee camps have been transformed into military zones. The logic of bio-power does not affect only the colonized but also the colonizer itself: there is much differentiation between Jews. In the 1980s, the "impure" blood of the Falash Jews (of Ethiopian origin) was designated as non-transmissible to other Jews; Mizrahis (Oriental Jews) were deprived of avenues to express their oriental culture, etc. Oren Yiftachel reveal this Israeli politics in what he called ethnocratic politics and the emergence of the ethno-class stratification and polarization in a system of 'creeping apartheid'. According to him, a systematically stratified citizenship has developed from the combination of "Judaization policies and religious-legal control. Several types of citizenship have emerged, differentiated by the combination of legal and informal rights and capabilities. Each category, especially among religious groups, is also divided internally on gender lines, with men enjoying a superior position. The groups include: a) "mainstream" Jewish citizens, b) ultra-Orthodox Jews, c) "pseudo-Jews" (mainly Russian immigrants recognized as Jews under the Israeli law of return, but not recognized as such by the religious establishment), d) Druze, f) Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship, g) Bedouins, h) East Jerusalem and Golan Arabs, i) Palestinians in the rest of the West Bank and Gaza and j) immigrant labor." (2002)
In addition, the regime will establish a certain presentation of the conflict and obstruct any alternative versions. Witness the unprecedented symbolic and physical violence directed at anti-colonialist Israelis; witness the repression of the Arab-Israeli group (Tayoush); the imprisonment of refuseniks; and the serious harassment of Israeli academics that question the orthodoxy (like Ilan Pappé). The states of exception and suspension are activated geographically. In the Occupied Territories, this juridical state is triggered especially in disaster areas like Nablus or in the refugee camps as a heterotopic place disconnecting from the local environment. Suspension is the rule of the game. Israel and the United States have insisted, since the second year of this Intifada, on a ceasefire rather than an end to occupation; and negotiations have been security related rather than political. An exception established by the colonial in the name of 'security, 'plan against the terrorism', 'emergency' and 'humanitarian crises'.
However, Agamben's notion of the state of exception is not only a juridical-legal concept but also a concept that stems from actions on the ground and what is de facto. Thus the possibility arises for the colonial state to act by proclaiming a state of exception to construct the Apartheid Wall.20 Nevertheless, Agamben did not take sufficiently into account the extent to which the exception becomes structured and consequently structuring and institutionalizing of life. Sidi Mohammed Barkat (2001) observed more structure in colonial and post-colonial systems: the erection of a body of exception (corps d'exception) for the colonized. Drawing from the French colonial experience in Algeria, Barkat noted an essential fact: the submission, from the beginning of the colonization, of the entire colonized civil population to a legal regime of exception, e.g., in the case of Algeria, the construction of a category called "French citizen with personal title" (citizen français à titre personnel) where nationality is not passed down. For Barkat "the submission of the colonized population to a regime of exception is the origin of the image of this body of exception with which they confound then in the social presentation. The body in which the colonized is reduced is precisely a body of exception, because s/he submits to a parallel penal law different from the common law, unique to the colonized. This law is established in the heart of the democratic system." 20 (2001)
We can sum up saying that this "spacio-cide" becomes possible through three mechanisms: The first mechanism is the bio-politics deployed by Israel; secondly, the capacity of this power as sovereign to proclaim the state of exception; and thirdly by enforcing a state of suspension. However the colonizers are not passive with those three mechanisms. They act using violent and non-violent modes of action, encircling the settler after being encircled by them, constructing home and society, creating visibility, mobilizing international global movement. The Palestinian 'voluntary' transfer cannot pass with an Israeli one. Many indicators show Israeli population quitting Israel and the year of 2003 was the less migration toward Israel since 1975.

III. Resisting the Colonial Order: Subjectivity of Colonized

Bio-politics renders possible the spacio-cide and spacio-cide creates de-territorized body, e.g. Palestinians without place in this territory or refugees literally without land. Spacio-cide leaves body without space. This body then becomes a subject again by exploding him/herself against an enemy that is also classified biologically and ethnically (the concept of Jews as a biological category emerges strongly in discursive level guiding different modes of action especially since the beginning of the second Intifada).
Spacio-cidal politics is in itself a suicidal politics. The uprooted body it creates is a body ready to explode. The uprooted body is a body without relationship to a territory; it is a body in orbit, a satellite. In the unipolar era of total imperialism under the hegemony of the United States, the very body becomes an uncontrollable and unsupervised object that will exercise its revenge. The satellites are the objects to control but are hard to control, and the result is a Ground Zero, whether as produced by individual terrorists (the World Trade Center), or by state terrorism (the Ground Zero in Jenin refugee camp).
But violence is not the only form of resistance. To counter the Israeli spacio-cidal project, Palestinians attach particular importance to transgressing the regime of exception by constructing their habitat without permit even if there is always the risk of demolition. A survey I conducted about the investment of the Palestinian diaspora in the Occupied Territories show clearly a heavy investment in construction. 22
The bio-politics deployed and the regime of exception that the sovereign proclaims are reinforced in the case of the Israeli and Palestinian actors because of the chain of victimization. In a mirror of interactions and projections, Israelis look at themselves as the exceptional victims, an exceptionality which stems from the exceptionality of the holocaust. The Palestinians also perceive themselves as the ultimate victims (the last colonized and the more numerous refugees in very log protracted situation) and they construct this exceptionality starting with the Nakba. In the same vein, as the Israeli "spacio-cide" is informed by the Zionist myth of land without people for people without land, the Palestinian refugees have created a dream of a land without people for refugees without land. The Palestinian refugees in the WBGS as well as in the diaspora have greater attachment to the land of Palestine than to the people of Palestine. In interviews, I find refugees insist on talking about property, the land, the Mediterranean Sea, Al Aqsa Mosque, Deir Bor'om Church, etc. and avoid the question of how they would live and with whom. I am not suggesting here the impossibility of the cooperation between Palestinian returnees and their Jewish neighbors but the necessity of thinking the return not only in term of geography but also in term of society.     
Bibliography/References              
1. The "land without people" statement was used occasionally by early Zionists to refer to the fact that the Arab residents of Turkish-ruled Palestine did not consider themselves to be a 'people' or 'nation' separate from the Arabs of surrounding countries; in those days, the Arab residents of Palestine usually referred to themselves as "Southern Syrians." The term was actually coined by a British Christian, Lord Shaftesbury, in 1853; the first time it was used in print by a Zionist was in 1901. For more details about this term, see (A. Garfinkle,  'On the Origin, Meaning, Use and Abuse of a Phrase', Middle Eastern Studies, October 1991).
2. According to Julie Peteet, citing Meron Benvenisti, the Arab communities were "white patches - terra incognita" in the mental map of Jews. He goes on to acknowledge that the settlers were aware of the Arab presence but that it "had no place in the Jew's perception of the homeland's landscape. They were just a formless, random collection ...viewed through an impenetrable glass wall" and had meaning only "as the objects of their perceptions and political concerns, but not as subjects in their own right". (Peteet, Julie (Forthcoming) Landscape of Hope and Despair: Place and Identity in Palestinian Refugee Camps, University of Pennsylvania Press).
3. For a recent espousal of this policy see the November 14, 2003 Haaretz interview with Israeli deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert entitled "Maximum Jews, Minimum Palestinians."
4. For more about the role of Israeli anthropologists in categorizing people see the thesis of Cedric Parizot, Le mois de la binevenue : réappropriations des mécanismes électoraux et réajustements de rapports de pouvoir chez les Bédouins du Néguev. EHESS, Paris. Thèse de Doctorat nouveau régime. 21 décembre. (2001).
5. The number of victims in this three year are from the Palestinian side 2785 deaths and more than 41,000 injured and from Israeli side 909 deaths and 6077 injured. Statistics indicate casualty rates from September 2000 to 11 January 2004. For Palestinian resource see http://www.palestinemonitor.org and for Israeli numbers see http://www.idf.il/daily_statistics/english/1.doc.
6. Israel used what Amira Hass (2003) called weapons of light construction which does not make a lot of noise like killing people, at least for the Western media.
7. See Hammami, Rema; Sari Hanafi and Elizabeth Taylor (2002) Destruction of Palestinian Institutions. Preliminary Report. April 13 2002. http://electronicintifada.net/forreference/briefings/civildestruction.shtml.
8. Sociocide, which is developed by the Palestinian political scientist Saleh Abdel Jawad (Abdel Jawad, Saleh (1997) "Sociocide: The Zionist Scheme for the Destruction of the Palestinian Society," printed in 3 parts in Palestine Report of Jerusalem Media Center, October 1997), is a concept that denotes policies used by one political entity for the total destruction of another, not only as a political national entity, but also as a society in all of its economic, social, and cultural dimensions. Its final objective is the complete replacement of one society by another. Israeli policy in Palestine can be usefully understood as an example of sociocide.
9. For instance, the destruction of the Port in Gaza as symbol of autonomy, or the canceling the Palestinian international phone code (970) etc. See also Baruch Kimmerling's book Politicide, Ariel Sharon's war Against the Palestinians (London: Verso Press, 2003) who claims that the primary goal of the Israeli government is the destruction of the PNA in particular and any Palestinian polity in general.
10. The invasion of this camp resulted in the destruction of 1,846 habitats from which 680 were completely destroyed and 1,166 partially.
11. This is according to a May 13, 2003 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) report. Often, the Israel Military Forces Spokesman's Office reports why a house was demolished: It was the family of an arrested terrorist, a wanted terrorist, a dead terrorist, the house was used to shoot at soldiers, the neighborhood sheltered armed men or tunnels, the house was built without a permit. But in many cases there are no explanations.
12. For more details about the destruction we can note that "during the first 15 months of the Intifada physical damage amounted to US$ 305 million. During the month-long invasion in March/April, the Israeli army destroyed and looted US$ 361 million worth of property. Since the beginning of the Intifada until February 2002, shelling & demolitions destroyed 720 homes completely and damaged 11,553; 73,600 people, 30 mosques, 12 churches, 134 water wells, cemeteries were affected; 34,606 olive & fruit trees were uprooted; 1,162.4 dunams of land confiscated, 14,339 dunams of land bulldozed or burned. During the March-April invasion, 881 homes were destroyed, 2,883 houses in refugee camps were damaged affecting 22,500 people. In the Gaza Strip more than 601 houses were completely demolished and approx.16,000 dunams of land mostly agricultural was razed by the Israeli army." See http://www.palestinemonitor.org.
13. In 2003, Daniel Seidmann, one of the Israeli lawyers who works with the Palestinian population to stop the separation wall, noticed that the military officers who defined the itinerary of the wall use maps for the Jerusalem area dating from 1967.
14. Communication in conference 'Political of humanitarism' Van Leer Institute (March 2004).
15. He recognizes this as a position of danger when, under modern conditions, ideas of the sacred are entwined with sovereign power, when the sacred is shattered into all aspects of bare biological life, making life itself the sacred terrain for all forms of governance, including the right to kill or to make.
16. As Agamben noted, biopolitics is the original exclusionary function of Western politics. Agamben G. (1995) Moyens sans fins. Notes sur la politique. Paris, Éditions Payot et Rivages -- (1998) Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Standford: Standford University Press.
17. See the analysis of Sylvaine Bulle in this respect.
18. According to human rights organizations, there were 297 extra-judicial killings. 149 of those were bystanders or "unintended" victims, killed as they were with the victim, 374 were children and 25 women. B'Tselem report: Illusions of restraint: Human Rights Violations During the Events in the Occupied Territories 29th September - 2nd December, 2000.
19. Communication by Adi Ophir at the Mada conference in Nazereth, 2003.
20. Personal communication with May Jayiusi.
21. Barkat developed in elegant manner his ideas on the body of exception. He wrote : "On ne saurait penser la condition des colonisés sans la référence à l'image du corps d'exception. Un corps représenté ainsi non pas simplement comme une réalité objective sur laquelle porteraient les coups de la répression coloniale, mais bien comme ce corps imaginé et institué par l'Etat et qui porte en lui, comme sa condition spéciale d'existence au sein de la nation, le principe qui régit la domination coloniale, c'est-à-dire le principe de subversion du rapport d'égalité au cœur des agencements et du dispositif démocratiques eux-mêmes. Ce principe qui colle donc à la peau du colonisé est ce que l'on pourrait appeler le principe d'arbitraire, le principe indiquant que le corps en question est susceptible d'être réprimé et brutalisé, sans possibilité sérieuse de recours légal. Ainsi, l'affaire ne consiste pas seulement en une classification, en un rangement des composantes de la société. Elle suppose l'inscription de l'exception à même le corps du colonisé, de sorte que ce corps fonctionne dans le système institutionnel comme un symbole, le symbole de la division inégalitaire de la société." (Barkat, Sidi Mohammed (1999) " Le '17 octobre 1961' ou la haine de la vie ", Revue Drôle d'époque, printemps, pp. 27 - 36. -- (2002) " Le corps d'exception et la citoyenneté intransmissible dans l'Algérie coloniale ", papier présenté au Collège international de philosophie, sept.-oct. 2001)