It has been asserted that the seeds of the troubles in Lebanon were sown when geographical Syria was divided at Versailles in 1920 into British and French mandates, contrary to the expressed wishes of the majority of its inhabitants.[1] Historically, geographical Syria designated several areas. In the Survey of International Affairs, Arnold Toynbee contended that:

Before the institution of these two mandates, the area they covered between them had been popularly known as 'Syria'. This name reflected the fact that, from the physical point of view, the combined area of the two mandated territories was sharply marked off from the surrounding regions - from Egypt by the Sinai Desert, from Najd by the Nafud, from Iraq by the Hamad, Shamiyah, and Jazirah steppes, from Anatolia by the Amanus Mountains, and from Europe by the Mediterranean.[2]

In an address given by George Antonius[3] in 1934, covering the evolution of the French Mandate in Syria, he elaborated on the meaning of the term "Syria" in the following manner:

Historically speaking, the term was used to denote that rectangle of land which forms the eastern boundary of the Mediterranean Sea, and is bounded on the north by the Taurus Mountains, on the east by the Syrian Desert, on the south by the Sinai Desert and Peninsula, and on the west by the Mediterranean Sea.[4]

In his book Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition,[5] Daniel Pipes devotes two pages to a discussion of the various definitions of Syria or, as he refers to it, "Greater Syria."[6] In words similar to those used by Antonius, he states:

Historically, the name Syria refers to a region far larger than the one presently contained by the state called Syria. At minimum, that Syria includes an irregular rectangle bounded by the Mediterranean Sea in the west, the Taurus and Anti-Taurus Mountains in the north, and the Syrian, Arabian, and Sinai deserts in the east and south.[7]

Two things of interest about Syria (in the historical sense) might here be usefully noted. The first is that historians describe the aforementioned rectangle as forming a remarkably compact geographical unit. George Antonius described this unit in these words: "A formidable barrier of mountains on the north, desert along its eastern and southern boundaries, and sea on the west - an almost perfect geographical rectangle."[8] Albert Hourani described the same geographical area, writing that "this area constitutes in many ways a single geographical unit, and its indigenous inhabitants form in some sense a single people."[9]

Antun Sa'adeh, it must be noted, saw Syria as a yet larger entity. He included in his definition of "Natural Syria" the Sinai Peninsula, Iraq and even Cyprus.[10] His definition of the "Syrian nation" is clearly different from the various definitions of geographical Syria found in historical sources. Whereas scholars have frequently confined their definition of geographical Syria to the western part of the Fertile Crescent,[11] Sa'adeh has included in his the eastern part of the Fertile Crescent as well as Cyprus.[12] In his opinion, the western and eastern parts of the Fertile Crescent, including Cyprus, constitute a single geographical unit. If the name "Syria" is in any way too limited to indicate this geographical unity, it can be altered to reflect the unity of the nation, Sa'adeh argued.[13] "Indeed, he suggested that 'Souraqia', an amalgamation of the Arabic forms of Syria and Iraq, could be used to reflect the unity of the western and eastern components of the Fertile Crescent..."[14]

The second important point about Syria (in the historical sense) is the relation of its geographic position to its economic and political significance. Geographically, Syria connects three continents, Europe from the south, Asia from the west and Africa from the east. This geographical position rendered Syria a "highway between West and East for trade and for culture."[15] Historians who write about the history of Syria tell us that "Syria has almost always been an important link in the trade-routes which connect the Mediterranean world with India and the Far East."[16] Its geographical position, moreover, contributed to its strategic importance. It rendered this land a battleground between great empires fighting for its control. As Sir George Adam Smith once wrote:

The military history of Syria may be pictured as the procession of nearly all the world's conquerors: Thothmes, Tiglath-Pileser, Sargon, Sennacherib and Nebuchadnezzar; Cambyses and Alexander; Pompey, Caesar, Augustus, Titus and Hadrian; Omar and Saladin; Tamerlane; Napoleon.[17]

Accordingly, during different phases of history, Syria was subdued by various conquerors. Each of them seized upon the whole country or a large portion thereof and established for a time confederations and other forms of government, leaving some mark on the life of the country. More recently, geographical Syria was again a battle-ground on which the modern French and British Empires competed for control and domination of the economically and strategically important Eastern Mediterranean lands. The politics of their imperial rivalry during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries led to the partitioning of geographical Syria and to the shuffling, carving and creation of a number of countries or other administrative configurations out of the Ottoman Empire.

As far as France was concerned, her Mandate territories (i.e., present-day Syria and Lebanon) were important for her investments, her access to oil and her cultural and commercial interests "as providing a link in France's communications with her Far Eastern possessions."[18] France, moreover, regarded herself as the protector of Christians throughout the Levant (i.e., present-day Syria and Lebanon, plus the sanjak of Alexandretta and what was Palestine) and claimed that she had moral obligations to be the custodian of this area, owing to her long-standing connection with it and her many missionary, religious, educational and humanitarian works. The Mandated territories were also important for strategic purposes. France wished, first, to protect her maritime and air routes to the Far East and, second, to maintain "her position as a Mediterranean Power, on a level with Great Britain and Italy."[19]

Great Britain, as a Mediterranean Sea power, was most concerned for her strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was necessary for her to bring, in addition to Iraq and Palestine, the rest of geographical Syria under her control, or otherwise under the control of a friendly power whose support for the British Government in any major international issue that might arise would be assured.
The Consequences of the Division of Geographical Syria

The division of geographical Syria caused several problems:

It established artificial boundaries in a country hitherto united by geography, history, economy and popular sentiment; it separated the interior of Syria from its natural ports of Tripoli, Beirut and Sidon; it hampered the movement of goods and people, and separated families across boundary lines and, above all, it created the conditions for future political instability.[20]

In his work, Syria and the French Mandate,[21] which deals with the history of Syria in the twentieth century, Philip Khoury describes the consequences of the division in a similar way, asserting:
The official partition of geographical Syria in 1920 into separately administered Mandates under French and British supervision isolated a truncated Syria and surrounded it by artificial boundaries and customs barriers which obstructed the free passage of goods and people. The people of Aleppo were cut off from their natural hinterland in Turkey and Iraq while Damascenes had to cross a policed border into Palestine.[22]
Nicola Ziadeh adopted a more positive perspective. He wrote:
... the people of Lebanon and Syria ['proper'], Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq grew accustomed to frontier check-posts, and came to consider their neighbours, who down to 1914 shared one country with them, as citizens of another 'country'.[23]

The Lebanese state with its current boundaries came into existence as a result of the partition of geographical Syria. The following discussion, however, will concentrate on the Mandate period of Lebanon's existence. The purpose of this discussion is to establish how the conditions for future political instability in Lebanon were created during this period.

The Conditions for Future Political Instability in Lebanon
France applied the principle of "divide and rule" in its sphere of influence. On September 1, 1920, the French High Commissioner, General Henri Gouraud, issued a decree establishing the state of Greater Lebanon under a separate administration. Moreover, three other areas were excluded from Syria proper and separately administered. Two of these areas, Latakia and Jabal al-Druze, were administered directly by the French, whereas the third, the sanjak of Alexandretta, was granted a special autonomous status, in accordance with Article Seven of the Franco-Turkish Treaty of October 1921.[24] The division of Syria was justified by the French on economic and administrative grounds. On his appointment as High Commissioner in November 1919, General Gouraud declared his principal task to be the economic restoration of the country. But as one author argued, "the division of the country cannot be justified either on economic or administrative grounds. Precisely for reasons of economic and administrative usefulness, unity is a necessity."[25] Thus, the same author described the division in the following words:

Political motives dictated the division, namely the desire to weaken the power of the nation as a whole; the 'States', parties, religious denominations, minorities, were played off systematically one against another in the interest of French colonial policy.[26]

According to Philip Khoury, the objective of dividing Syria was to contain the nationalist movement. As he put it: "But the carving up of geographical Syria was only the first stage of the partition process. Once the French seized their share of the pie, they immediately sought to divide it into even smaller pieces in order to isolate and contain the Arab nationalist movement."[27]

The French practice of "divide and rule," which resulted in the establishment of the state of Greater Lebanon, satisfied the desire of some Maronite Christians for a national home. For a long time the Maronites had longed for a viable autonomous state, an enlarged one that would be greater than the mutasarrifiyyah of Mount Lebanon (1860-1915) and would offer economic viability as well.[28] The mutasarrifiyyah "lacked economic foundations, cut off from the commerce of Beirut and the agriculture of the [Biqa']."[29]

The autonomous mutasarrifiyyah of Mount Lebanon was different from the new state of Greater Lebanon. In the mutasarrifiyyah, the Christians formed the majority, whereas in Greater Lebanon they were no longer predominant, as General Gouraud had included in the new state the coastal cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, Tyre and their administrative hinterlands as well as the Biqa' valley. These annexations "offered a semblance of geostrategic and economic viability...,"[30] yet swelled the non-Maronite and non-Christian elements within the population, for the areas in question were Sunni and Shi'ite-dominated.[31] Consequently, the size of the Sunni population was increased almost eight times (bringing it to 21 percent of the total population), and the Shi'ites four times (18.5 percent of the total population). In contrast, the Maronite population increased by only one third (29 percent of the total population). They became a slight plurality, the largest group in a country of minorities. As Mordechai Nisan puts it: "The Maronites remained the largest single community in the country but only slightly ahead of the Sunnis."[32]

Protest and Resentment
While the creation of Greater Lebanon pleased some Maronite Christians, it was a source of resentment for the majority of inhabitants of the newly annexed areas, including the Sunnis (who came under Christian control) as well as the Orthodox Christians. These "Lebanese" protested against the division of September 1920 and sought to achieve reunification with mother Syria. In this context, Khoury pointed out that "most of Lebanon's newly acquired 'citizens' did not want to be part of a Maronite-dominated Lebanon and agitated for union with the rest of Syria."[33] They expressed their agitation on many occasions and in several forms. Demonstrations, strikes and riots occurred in the streets of Beirut and Tripoli; meetings and conferences were organized by notables, leaders and political parties; memorials, petitions, and telegrams were sent to the High Commission, the French government and the League of Nations; delegations travelled to Damascus, Paris, Washington and met with officials, etc... All these instances and more stand as examples of efforts made to achieve reunification with Syria.[34]

Furthermore, it should be emphasized that resentment and opposition to French officials and their colonial methods were expressed not only in the confines of the enlarged Lebanon, but in other parts of Syria. The initial period of the French Mandate, particularly from 1920 to 1927, was essentially a period of darkness, repression and rebellions of varying magnitude. It truly seemed to be, as George Antonius described it, "like a dark age of blindness and folly and waste, in which the mandatory Power and her officials sowed the seeds of trouble and reaped its harvest in the rebellion with which the period closes."[35]

During this period, harsh colonial methods and policies were enforced by three successive Generals; Gouraud, Weygand and Sarrail, all of whom held the office of the High Commissioner and exercised their powers under martial law. These High Commissioners "pursued a policy, not of understanding and co-operation, but of the strong hand."[36] In Lebanon, they followed a policy that emphasized the "confessional" nature of the state and created a diversity of confessional interests and divisions. On many occasions, however, their tactics of employing the Christians against the Muslims proved unsuccessful. "For," as Paul Olberg observed at the time (1937), "the Maronites, and also most of the other Christians, feel closely united with their Syrian home."[37] Olberg added, "They have proved this unity conclusively more than once."[38] Indeed, the people of geographical Syria expressed their dissatisfaction in various risings and rebellions. The following major uprisings took place: In the region of Antioch and Alexandretta, under the leadership of Subhi Barakat; in the Latakia region in 1920, under the leadership of Sheikh Saleh; in Northern Syria, under the leadership of Ibrahim Hanano; in Damascus in 1923; in the Ba'albek district in 1923, led by Melhem Kasim; and the great revolt of 1925. This latter revolt was Druze in origin. It started under the leadership of Sultan al-Altrash in the Hauran district (Jabal al-Druze), but quickly spread into the newly annexed districts in Lebanon, a sign that the population in these districts was disaffected with the French and still considered itself Syrian.[39]

The Lebanese Republic
In 1926, a French committee drew up a constitution for Greater Lebanon without consulting the people.[40] In accordance with this constitution, which was modelled largely after the French Third Republic in defining various political powers, Greater Lebanon was to become a republic. The aim was to demonstrate to the League of Nations that Lebanon now had self-government. Consequently, the first president of this republic, Charles Dabbas, was elected on May 26, 1926. On May 31, the first Cabinet was formed. Confessionalism was adopted, according to Article 95 of the constitution, as a basis for distributing seats in the Chamber and the Cabinet. By emphasizing the "confessional" nature of the new Republic, the French succeeded "in creating a diversity of interests which drove people into enclaves."[41]

The wishes of the majority of the Lebanese regarding reunification with Syria were not fulfilled, but instead Lebanon gained independence from France in 1946, the French soldiers leaving in December of that year.

Hence, during the period of the French Mandate, and as a result of the partitioning of geographical Syria, the conditions for future political instability in Lebanon were created. These conditions may be summarized as follows:

First, the establishment of political states (e.g., Syria 'proper' and Lebanon), each with its own flag, government, and artificial boundaries, and each planning and implementing specific policies that may contradict the policies of the other. This situation created a number of political causes instead of one national cause. It also promoted "regionalism," as this favoured French interests. Moreover, it can be argued that the establishment of separate political states, independent of each other, created obstacles in the way of political movements that strive to promote national unity and the integration of different population groups in these states. Indeed, this situation must be seen as not only promoting disunity, but fostering the growth of separatist tendencies as well, particularly among the Maronites
Second, the French strengthened the confessional brand of sectarianism in political life not only in Greater Lebanon, but also in the whole Mandated territory, which they subdivided into a number of sectarian states.

As far as Greater Lebanon was concerned, sectarianism was enshrined by French decree as the basis of the future political system of this new enlarged state. Consequently, confessionalism was formalized in most of the political institutions of the country.

Third, the French, in addition to encouraging sectarianism in political life, also introduced "feudality" into politics through the "list" system.[42]

Fourth, the French encouraged the spread of the French language and culture among Maronites and other Catholics. The French language became a spoken second tongue for the Maronites, who adopted it as a cultural tool and conducted conversation in it with facility. Mordechai Nisan asserts in his study on the minority peoples of the Middle East that the French language "...acted to differentiate the Maronites from other Christian and Muslim denominations."[43] Some Maronites wanted the French language to become the official language in the educational system. According to Nisan, the poet Sa'id 'Aql "called for replacing Arabic by French in Lebanese education."[44] As a result of the spread of the French language and culture, many Maronites and Catholics in Lebanon considered themselves culturally French and wanted to be isolated from the Arab world.[45]

Furthermore, many Maronite Christians came to believe in "Phoenicianism" and "Mediterraneanism," notions that "were encouraged and fostered by the French."[46]Theorists of "Phoenicianism" propagated the idea that the Lebanese were "racially and culturally Phoenician in origin and different from the Arabs."[47]

Similarly, propagandists of "Mediterraneanism" theorized that Lebanese culture is "Mediterranean" rather than Arab. They argued, first, that Lebanon geographically belongs to the Mediterranean basin. Lebanon and the Near East, Michel Chiha contended, "belong in the first place to the Mediterranean world, whereas the Middle East properly speaking belongs primarily to the world of the Indian Ocean."[48] Second, that the Lebanese originated from the same racial group that inhabited the Mediterranean basin and, consequently, share with the Mediterranean peoples a number of characteristics which they may not share with their nearest neighbours.

The two movements, "Phoenicianism" and "Mediterraneanism," developed at the same time and seemed to complement each other. They had a common objective, i.e., to isolate Lebanon from its nearest neighbours. In 1936 Al-Kata'ib al-Lubnaniyyah (Lebanese Phalanges), a Maronite-led paramilitary organization with a mixed Christian following,[49] was founded to protect and propagate Lebanese Christian interests "against the increasing tide of Arab nationalist sentiment that was manifesting itself in the 1930s and early 1940s."[50]

The Kata'ib Party was identified as "the harbinger of extreme Lebanese nationalism."[51] The chief founder of this party, Piérre al-Jumayyil, regarded Lebanon as a separate and distinct nation with a special mission that is "incompatible with that which the Arabs aspire generally to realize."[52] "Lebanon," he argued, "is a soul, a spiritual principle. It would be materially possible to absorb it into a Syrian or Arab empire temporarily; it is spiritually impossible to unite it to a world which does not share its state of soul, its spiritual principles."[53]

While the school of "Lebanese nationalism" prevailed among the Christians of Lebanon, the adherents of the school of "Arab nationalism" were mostly Muslims.[54] "To most Muslims in Lebanon...," Yamak says, "... Islam and Arabism are intimately connected and in fact complementary."[55] Hence, the adherents of Arab nationalism emphasized the common destiny and culture that Lebanon shared with the other Arab states, and proclaimed that it should be an integral part of the "Arab nation." This latter, according to the constitution of the Ba'th party, "constitutes a cultural unity. Any differences existing among its sons are accidental and unimportant. They will all disappear with the awakening of the Arab consciousness."[56]

Unlike both Lebanese nationalism and Arab nationalism, Syrian nationalism attracted Lebanese from all religious sects in Lebanon. The founder of the school of Syrian nationalism, Antun Sa'adeh, asserted that Lebanon is a part of natural Syria, or the region that is known as the Fertile Crescent. His principles of Syrian nationalism, Sa'adeh explained, constitute the synthesis of the thesis of Phoenician nationalism and the antithesis of Arab nationalism.[57] He also emphasized that "the principle of Syrian nationhood is not based on race or blood, but rather on the natural social unity derived from homogeneous intermixing."[58] Sa'adeh's organization, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, however, could not attract as large a membership as did the confessional political parties in Lebanon. Its following was not strong enough to provide it with access to power.

The views of the above-mentioned schools of nationalism monopolized the thinking of the Lebanese during the Mandate period. The divisions among the Lebanese in relation to the question of national identity were due to the ideas propagated by these schools. Antun Sa'adeh, it must be noted, saw these divisions before establishing his party. In this regard, he said:

When I began, at the outset of my nationalist consciousness, to give serious thought to the resuscitation of our nation against the background of the irresponsible political movements rampant in its midst, it became forthwith certain to me that our most urgent problem was the determination of our national identity and our social reality.[59]

Sa'adeh added:

Although there was no consensus of opinion concerning this problem [the determination of the national identity], I became convinced that the starting-point of every national endeavour must be the raising of this fundamental question: Who are we?[60]

The schools of nationalism mentioned above continued to reflect the thinking of the Lebanese after the French Mandate and to contribute to the persistence of the problem of national identity. Many historians, scholars, sociologists and observers of modern Lebanon's history, therefore, have dealt with this problem as a topic of discussion. Most of them have considered it one of Lebanon's fundamental problems. Professor Munir Khoury, for example, has regarded it as "probably the most serious problem that underlies the Lebanese predicament..."[61] He has also blamed it for causing many of Lebanon's problems. As he puts it:

This dilemma of national identity, in our opinion, is behind many of the Lebanese social, political and economic problems. Sectarianism, familism, parochialism, tribalism, feudalism and many other "isms" have all been inflated as a result of the absence- or at best the weakness- of that necessary protective umbrella: the State. This State, most likely, shall remain either ineffectively weak or absent, as is the case today, as long as a national identity remains to be vacillating.[62]

The problem of national identity has also contributed to Lebanon's catastrophes and civil wars. Indeed, later problems and civil wars that took place in the country at different stages were mainly related to the divisions and the lack of consensus among the Lebanese concerning the determination of their national identity. According to Halim Barakat, this problem "has rendered Lebanon a mosaic and fragmented society without a core or a focus and has doomed it to constant tensions and conflicts including violent confrontations such as those of the 1958 and 1975-76 civil wars."[63] (The latest Lebanese civil war continued well-beyond 1976. Therefore, the above dates can be extended to the point when the civil war ended, i.e., 1990) Other writers and political analysts have also commented on this problem. In his analysis of the early period of the last Lebanese civil war, Walid Khalidi muses: "At the base of intra-Lebanese violence and conflict is a crisis of identity and loyalty."[64] By the same token, Norman Howard says:

Lebanon's main problem thus remains the lack of agreement over her national identity-whether she is to be Arab or Lebanese, Muslim or Christian, confessional or secular, capitalist or socialist, pro-western or closely aligned with the Arab bloc, independent or part of a larger Arab state.[65]

Since the Mandate period, Lebanon has lived with its dilemma of national identity, which is in effect a dilemma of loyalty. This led Ralph E. Crow to state: "It is not much of an exaggeration to say that Lebanon has lived in a continuous identity crisis."[66] Accordingly, it might be claimed that, for some decades to come, Lebanon will continue to live with an unresolved identity crisis.

All the developments that took place during the Mandate period constituted the roots of future political instability in Lebanon. As mentioned earlier, Lebanon gained its independence but, in reality, what the French left behind them conditioned this independence. The state of independence was described by the leader of the SSNP in his speech upon his return to Lebanon in 1947. He said:
In the present state of independence, the nation [natural Syria] has exited from the cells wherein it had been [imprisoned]. It exited from the prison within the massive outer walls which were erected by the [colonialists]. But up till now, it is still within the massive walls that encircle the prison buildings. Today we are outside the cells but we are still within the walls. The doors which lead to the inside are open. But those which lead to the outside are still guarded by the jailers, who most often are of us. This is our present state of independence.[67]

ENDNOTES:
[1] Geographical Syria was partitioned by the principal Allied Powers at the San Remo Conference on 24 April, 1920. The plan of partition adopted by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 22 of the League Covenant, was initially drawn up in secret by Britain, France and Russia in the spring of 1916. The spring of 1916 witnessed the three Powers enter into the Sykes-Picot Agreement, according to which Syria was to be divided into spheres of influence. Thus, at the San Remo Conference, the Mandatories ['A' Mandates] were selected: France won the mandate for the northern half of geographical Syria and Great Britain for the southern half (including Mesopotamia ), with the obligation of implementing the policy of the Balfour Declaration. The terms of the Mandates were formally confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations on July 24, 1922.
[2] Arnold Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1925, Vol. 1, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 347-348.
[3] The author of The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938.
[4] George Antonius, "Syria and the French Mandate," International Affairs, July 1934, p.p. 523-524.
[5] Daniel Pipes, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
[6] Pipes points out that "the pre-1918 area is variously called Geographic Syria, Greater Syria, Historic Syria, Natural Syria, or United Syria." He explains that "Greater Syria" (Suriyya al-Kubra), "being the most familiar term in English... is the one adopted in his book." See ibid., p. 31.
[7] Ibid., p. 14.
[8] George Antonius, “Syria and the French Mandate,” op. cit., p. 524.
[9] Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay, London: Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 4.
[10] According to Sa'adeh, the Syrian homeland "extends from the Taurus range in the northwest and the Zagros mountains in the northeast to the Suez canal and the Red Sea in the south and includes the Sinai peninsula and the gulf of Aqaba, and from the Syrian sea (i.e., the Mediterranean Sea) in the west, including the island of Cyprus, to the arch of the Arabian desert and the Persian gulf in the east. (This region is also known as the Syrian Fertile Crescent)." Quoted in Haytham Kader, The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: Its Ideology and Early History, Beirut: Haytham A. Kader, 1990, p. 42.
[11] This is clear in Hourani's determination of the Fertile Crescent. He states: "Running in a semi-circle around the edge of the Syrian Desert is the 'Fertile Crescent', a belt of cultivable land bounding the area of pasturage. It may itself be divided into two parts. The western part is a land of mountain-ranges, valleys and plains; this is geographical Syria. The eastern part is a vast plain, created and maintained by the two great rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, which run southwards through it, finally meeting and flowing together into the Persian Gulf; this is Iraq or Mesopotamia." See Albert Hourani, op. cit., p. 6.
[12] The term Syria will be used in this study in three different meanings. First, it will be used to refer to the present-day State of Syria or Syrian Republic. When used in this meaning, it will be either indicated as such or inferred from the context. Second, it will be used to refer to the "Syrian nation" as defined by Sa'adeh. It will only be employed in this meaning when quoting Sa'adeh or referring to statements by the SSNP. Third, it will be used to refer to "geographical Syria" as defined above by George Antonius and designating the territories composed of the present republics of Syria and Lebanon, the sanjak of Alexandretta (the Hatay), Palestine, and [Trans-]Jordan. Its use in this meaning will be indicated by using the phrase "geographical Syria. "
[13] Haytham Kader, op. cit., p. 38.
[14] Ibid.
[15] George Antonius, "Syria and the French Mandate," op. cit., p. 524.
[16] Albert H. Hourani, op. cit., p. 10.
[17] Sir George Adam Smith, Syria and the Holy Land, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1918, p. 7.
[18] Albert H. Hourani, op. cit., p. 154.
[19] Ibid., p. 155.
[20] Najib E. Saliba, "Syrian-Lebanese Relations," in Halim Barakat (ed.) Toward a Viable Lebanon, London : Croom Helm, 1988, p. 147.
[21] Philip S. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945, London: I.B. Tauris, 1987.
[22] Ibid., p. 57.
[23] Nicola A. Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon, London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1957, p. 60.
[24] Nicola A. Ziadeh, ibid., p. 60.
[25] Paul Olberg, "France in Syria," The Contemporary Review, vol. 151, March, 1937, p. 306.
[26] Ibid., p. 307.
[27] Philip S. Khoury, op. cit., p. 57.
[28] Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East, Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company Inc. Publishers, 1991, pp. 179-180
[29] Ibid., p. 178.
[30] Ibid., p. 181.
[31] The coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon were Sunni dominated, whereas the Biqa' and the extreme south were Shi'ite dominated.
[32] Mordechai Nisan, op. cit., p.181.
[33] Philip S. Khoury, op. cit., p. 57.
[34] For details concerning protest and reaction see both Najib E. Saliba, op. cit., p. 147, and Daniel Pipes, "Damascus and the Claim to Lebanon," in ORBIS (Vol 30, no. 4, Winter 1987), pp. 668-669.
[35] George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, op. cit., p. 376.
[36] Paul Olberg,
The Division of Natural Syria
Historical Background

Dr. Edmond Melhem
14
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Joyce L. Miller, "The Syrian Revolt of 1925," International Journal Of Middle East Studies, Vol. 8, no. 4 (1977), p. 545.
[40] Michel Chiha, a banker and journalist, was the secretary of the drafting committee.
[41] Nicola A. Ziadeh, op. cit., p. 50
[42] A French decree allowed any group of citizens in some electoral constituencies that were multi-seat districts to combine and form a list, or slate, of candidates. Due to the pervasiveness of clan influence and loyalties, however, the implementation of the list system resulted in the formation of lists headed by strong clan leaders. As Hess and Bodman put it, "the list system permitted the strong, landed individual to become 'chief of the list'. Thus was the new 'feudality' established." See Clyde G. Hess, Jr. And Herbert L. Bodman, Jr., "Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics," Middle East Journal (Vol. 8, no 1, 1954), p. 16.
[43] Mordechai Nisan, op. cit., 172.
[44] Ibid.
[45] As Emile Eddé a Lebanese president under the French Mandate, publicly stated, Lebanon was a "Christian island" in a Muslim sea, its culture Western and French. Quoted in Fahim L. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1961, p. 17.
[46] Quoted in ibid., p. 17.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Quoted in Labib Z. Yamak, The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: An Ideological Analysis, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969, p. 51.
[49] Kamal Salibi asserts that "after 1949, attempts were made to transform this paramilitary organization into a real party with a national rather than a confessional following, even to the extent of changing its name to the Social Democratic Party. The effort, however, met with no success." See his book, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, p. 188.
[50] John P. Entelis, "Structural Change and Organizational Development in the Lebanese Kata'ib Party," Middle East Journal, Vol. 27, Winter 1973, p. 21.
[51] Labib Z. Yamak, op. cit., p. 45.
[52] Piérre Jumayyil, "Lebanon," in Kemal Karpat (ed.), Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, New York: Frederick Praeger, 1968, p. 108.
[53] Ibid.
[54] This should not imply that Christians were not attracted to this school. In fact, many of its ideologues and leaders, such as Qustantin Zurayk, George Habash, Michel 'Aflaq, Clovis Maqsud, etc..., were Christians.
[55] Labib Z. Yamak, op. cit., p. 39.
[56] See "The Constitution of the Arab Ba'th Party," in Sylvia G. Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism: An Anthology, Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962, p. 233.
[57] Antun Sa'adeh, Al-Muhadarat al-'Ashr (The Ten Lectures) Beirut: SSNP, 1976, p. 69.
[58] Ibid., p. 65.
[59] Antun Sa'adeh, ibid., p. 27.
[60] Ibid., p. 27.
[61] Munir Khoury, What is Wrong with Lebanon ?, Beirut: Al-Hamra Publishers, 1990, p. 47.
[62] Ibid., pp. 57-58.
[63] Halim Barakat, Lebanon in Strife: Student Preludes to the Civil War, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977, p. 15.
[64] Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East, Center for International Affairs: Harvard University, 1979, p. 146.
[65] Norman Howard, "Upheaval in Lebanon," Current History, 70-71, No. 412, January, 1976, p. 6.
[66] Ralph E. Crow, "Lebanon," in Jacob M. Landau, Ergun Ozbudun and Frank Tachau (eds.), Electoral Politics in the Middle East: Issues, Voters and Elites, London: Croom Helm, 1980, p. 55
[67] Antun Sa'adeh, Al-In'izaliyyah 'Aflasat (1947-1949) (Isolationism Has Gone Bankrupt), 1st edition, Beirut: SSNP, 1976, p. 27.