The day of Maysalun is one of the most important days in the modern history of Syria. It marked the beginning of the end of the first central government in Syria after centuries of foreign occupation. The cherished dream of an independent and sovereign state in the country collapsed on that day and a new political map, drawn by the Europeans for European interests, emerged. Almost every country with stakes in the region would benefit from this map except Syria. To this day, Maysalun reverberates throughout the country.
The importance of Maysalun was underscored long ago by Sati' al-Husri, who was the Minister of Education in the Government of the day:
"We do not exaggerate when we say that this day was a turning point in the history of the Arab cause. The first chapter ended and a new one began. On this day the regular army that had been organized during the Arab Revolt was broken up. Thereafter the leaders of the Revolt and the protagonists of nationalism scattered in all directions and entered into a new life of struggle, arduous and ramified, which in various respects differed significantly from what had prevailed during the preceding phase."
Yet, despite its historical substance, Lebanese and independent foreign observers have attributed scant significance to Maysalun. This scantiness is attested to by the dearth of scholarly attention given to the event in the current literature. A few historians and political scientists have discussed the "Day of Maysalun" in various ways, but largely in an inadequate manner making passing remarks and short statements that more often than not leave the reader lost and confused. Even exclusive studies of the Syrian Question (1914-1920) brush past Maysalun as if nothing had happened. The principal reason for this "lies in the very nature of the circumstances obtaining on that day and the many surprises found on its final pages. Owing to the great speed and many complications characterizing the events just prior to Maysalun, it has proved very difficult for most observers to ascertain the complete details. After the battle, moreover, a good many of these men were dispersed throughout the Arab World and began a new and violent struggle which diverted them from thinking about assembling the relevant documents and publishing a report so that the people could learn the facts." As well, people don't like to write about failures or defeats and much prefer to gloss over such incidents than treat them for what they really are.
The only available comprehensive account of Maysalun can be found in al-Husri's "The Day of Maysalun". It is an important reference but does not cover the actual battle. Nonetheless, the book is useful for the period before and after Maysalun and because al-Husri was physically involved in Syrian politics at the time:
"Fate decreed that at that time I should be in the center of the stage, a privileged position from which I could witness all the events at close range. This was due to my having been a member of the Council of Directors which functioned as a cabinet from its formation until the proclamation of independence, a minister in the first cabinet constituted after independence, and a minister in the second government that followed and remained in power until the Day of Maysalun. Thus, I was able to obtain first hand information from the inception of the case until its end."
So what actually happened at Maysalun and why is it regarded as a turning point in Syrian's modern history? To answer this twofold question, we must first examine closely the events leading to it.
During the Ottoman occupation of geographical Syria, which began in 1516, administrative control was divided up between vilayets (provinces) centred on the region's major towns. The collapse of Ottoman rule in the wake of Turkey's defeat in World War I led to a re-organization of the region's political structures. In October 1918, Amir Feisal, son of Sharif Husayn of the Hijaz, entered Damascus with his troops. He hoped to replace Turkish suzerainty with the sovereignty of his family, the Hashimites. In agreements between his father and the British, known as the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, the Hashimites had been promised the opportunity to establish an Arab state in return for their role in leading the Arab revolt against the Ottomans. Amir Feisal was full of hopes for Syria:
"France and England engaged in the war in the east, which was launched by the ambitions of Germany, in order to liberate completely and finally the peoples who have for many generations been oppressed by the Turkish regime and to set up local governments and administrations deriving their authority from the free choice of the indigenous population. France and England have agreed to recognize, encourage, and support the establishment of such local governments and administrations in Syria and Iraq, the countries already liberated by the Allies, as well as in those areas which they are still striving to liberate. It is not the intention of France and England to impose any regime upon the inhabitants of these regions. Rather, their sole concern is to offer such aid as will facilitate the work of the governments and administrations which the peoples themselves may choose. to ensure honest and equal justice for all, to promote the economic development of the country by stimulating local initiative and urging the spread of education, and to put an end to the old Turkish policy of creating dissension."
However, under the terms of the Sykes Picot agreement, signed between Britain and France in 1916, the Ottoman territories were to be divided up between the European powers. The Paris Peace Conference and an American commission of enquiry failed to settle the conflicting claims. As soon as the French learned about the German efforts to conclude an armistice and sensed that the danger to their country had been averted, they began to exert pressure on the English to hand over the Syrian territories allocated to them in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The British High Command in Cairo then ordered Emir Feisal, leader of the northern army, to relinquish the Syrian coasts to the French forces. The High Command's instructions were carried out. French troops disembarked first in Beirut on October 8, 1918, then in the other ports from Tyre to Iskenderun. Arab flags were lowered in all the coastal cities, although no others were raised in their places.
The French then set out to thwart the Syrians of the interior and eastern zone by agitating the Christians and other minorities and making them apprehensive about the Moslems. They asserted that the army engaged in the Revolt was a Bedouin, Hejazi army and that the government to be formed by it would surely be a religious, reactionary regime that would guide itself by the Islamic law codes and restore the situation of 60 years ago, annulling the rights of the Christians in the process. The fact of the matter is that everything pointed in precisely the opposite direction. The leaders of the Revolt were not Bedouins, and a considerable number of them were Christians. The government organized in Syria never gave a thought to religious coloring; indeed many posts and functions were entrusted to non-Moslems.
However, this negativism was not critical enough to sway the Syrians. Day by day pessimism yielded to optimism, heartened by President Wilson's pledge to Emir Faisal: "If the people demand independence as a right, I shall permit no government ever to dominate Syria." When President Wilson decided to strengthen this promise by sending a commission to study conditions in the country and consult with the population regarding their wishes, the hopes of even the cynical were fortified. The "arrival of the Commission of Inquiry," al-Husri recalled, "created fresh waves of enthusiasm. The overwhelming consensus of opinion in favor of independence, as manifested during the questioning, made optimism soar to new heights."
Soon, however, other news with portents of a distressing change in policy toward Syria began to arrive. The Anglo-French Agreement of September 15, 1919 provided for the evacuation of British forces from the western and eastern zones and their replacement in a section of the latter by French forces. This news provoked a fierce reaction in the country, for everyone was impatiently waiting for the day when all foreign armies would be withdrawn from Syria, particularly the French forces. It also placed the Government in Syria in a catch-22 situation: it had either to oppose this agreement or yield to the order and consent to the replacement of British troops by French. The latter signified an abandonment of nationalist desires and a retreat before French desires. The Government therefore decided to stand firm. Vigorously protesting the order, it notified the British and French commanders that French troops would not be permitted to enter any portion of the eastern zone and that they would be resisted, if necessary, by force of arms. The French backed-off, but on tactical grounds.
After Feisal failed to reach with Premier Clemenceau a treaty to regularize the relations between Syria and France, the mood in Syria hardened. Most of the Syrian intellectuals and politicians began to think alone new lines and to incline to the idea of producing a fail accompli by an immediate proclamation of independence without waiting for the Peace Conference to determine Syria's fate. The problem was that position of the army and government in Syria was anomalous. The army was legally still part of the Allied forces, like all the other troops stationed in the Near East, subordinate to Marshal Allenby's command, and the Syrian Government was still legally a military administration ruling the country in accordance with international law as applied to the administration of occupied enemy territory.
For Syrians, "it was very strange to consider the Arab army in Syria, like the French, part of the occupation forces. It was even stranger to consider Syria occupied territory with respect to the Arab army and to the government, which was composed of people from the country itself." A declaration of independence was deemed to be the only way to overcome these obstacles. And, thus, the Syrian Congress representing all sections of the country passed a resolution to this effect. The Resolution containing the proclamation of Syrian independence was read on that day from the balcony of Town Hall in Damascus before a large crowd of people and officially communicated to the Allied governments. It was greeted with great joy throughout Syria and elsewhere in the Arab world. It said in part:
We the members of this Congress, in our capacity as true representatives of all the Syrians in whose name we speak, hereby proclaim ... the full and absolute independence of our country Syria, including Palestine, within her natural boundaries, based on a civil, representative form of government, protection of the rights of minorities, and rejection of the claims of the Zionists to Palestine as a national homeland or place of immigration for the Jews.
The proclamation provoked strong anger in European circles, chiefly in England and France. The reason is that the resolution embraced Palestine and demanded the independence of Iraq. Moreover, it was coordinated with the resolution on Iraqi independence passed by the Iraqi Congress meeting in Damascus. Therefore, Lord Curzon, then British Foreign Secretary, sent a sharply-worded cable in the name of the British and French governments protesting that the Syrian government was not a legally constituted body and that announcement of the said resolution would hinder the Peace Conference in its efforts to solve the Turkish problem. King Faisal was compelled to refute these charges by pointing out that the Syrian Congress which passed the resolution was the same Congress that had held many meetings over a long period of time without any objections having been raised by the British government.
Events now followed one another swiftly as tension between France and Syria mounted day by day. The French started forcibly to repress the manifestations of nationalism in the western zone, while they intensified their intrigues, espionage, and use of agents provocateurs in the eastern zone: they inspired newspapers in their zone to attack Syria and defame its King; they warned incorruptible patriotic newspapers to couple any reference to Faisals name with the epithet of king, closing down those which refused comply and punishing the editors. As against this, the recruitment of soldiers in the eastern zone proceeded apace. The Ministry of Defense issued a series of communiqués to inform the people of the progress made throughout the country. Newspapers kept on publishing fiery articles to intensify patriotic sentiment. From time to time there were noisy mass demonstrations in the streets and public squares designed to show the readiness of the populace to make whatever sacrifices might be necessary to preserve the independence and honor of the country.
Everything pointed to the imminence of a grave crisis that would determine the fate of the country once and for all. Finally, on July 11th the tension exploded with the news that a French ultimatum was on the way. Prior to the arrival of this ultimatum, the Syrian Government sent the following telegram to the various Consulates in Damascus for transmission to their Governments, on July 11, 1920:
Following the massing of French troops on the border between the eastern and western zones in Syria and the creation of military bases in preparation for war, General Gouraud declared that he had conditions that he wanted me to fulfill. These conditions - up to now I've read unofficially only a part of them - plainly aim at the destruction of our national sovereignty. Insofar as he made any statements, the General said that he would place obstacles in the way of my trip to Paris unless his demands were met and that the French Government would refuse to discuss the Syrian case with me if I didn't go through the western zone en route.
I have the honor to call the attention of the Allied Powers and the League of Nations to this act and request that they intervene to prevent Syria's yielding to force and becoming a victim of the militaristic spirit, the annihilation of which was the major objective of the Great War. I am relying on the fairness of the Allies to avert bloodshed and the total ruination of this country which sacrificed so much in their behalf.
I ask you to form an Allied arbitration commission to review General Gouraud's demands. My people and I pledge ourselves in advance to accept and abide by the decisions of this board.
The Syrian National Congress then met and issued a proclamation to the nation and the entire world consisting of the following:
(1) We desire only peace and the preservation of our independence and honor which must remain unblemished.
(2) We are innocent of any charges or insinuations that we want to disturb the relations between ourselves and any of our Allies.
(3) We do not reject negotiation; on the contrary, we welcome it. The delegation headed by His Majesty is ready to negotiate at any time. We shall accept any solution that does not impair our independence and honor and is based on right and independence.
(4) We are fully prepared and adamant in our determination to defend our honor and rights with all the strength that God has given us.
By now, however, the French had become too intolerant to listen to such gestures and pushed ahead with their plans to occupy the rest of Syria. An official ultimatum was sent to the Syrian Government on the day after the above statement was read demanding full surrender:
I have the honor to send my note dated July 14th. I submit it to Your Royal Highness in the hope that your exalted character, sincere patriotism, and friendly sentiments toward France will lead you to accept it.
France has shown her devotion to Syria by agreeing to assume the responsibility for guiding the new state and providing honest leadership. Thus, I should like to believe that Your Highness will listen to the voice of wisdom in handling this grave matter and refrain from backing a government that represents only extremist elements among the population.
I do not think I can be sure that the guarantees I am asking of Your Highness will be implemented as long as the present anti-French government remains in office. This government is endeavoring to drag your country into war and plunge it into the furnace of woes. Only the action of Your Royal Highness can ward off this disaster.
The Ultimatum of July 14, 1920, contained five important demands:
(a) placing the Rayaq-Aleppo Railroad under French management;
(b) acquiescing in the French mandate;
(C) halting the draft and discharging those already in uniform;
(d) accepting the paper currency printed by the Syrian Bank; and
(e) punishing the criminals who have continuously showed enmity toward France.
These five conditions, the ultimatum adds, are offered "as an invisible whole" which must be accepted or rejected in toto.
The Syrian government protested the Ultimatum in the strongest terms and telegrammed "Representatives of the Powers" to ask for their assistance:
We appeal to the sense of justice of the Allies, who repeatedly proclaimed at the Syrians would enjoy freedom and independence, and to the conscience the leaders of your free governments. We beg your government in the name of humanity and peace, which we have exerted ourselves with all our might to Lard, to try to solve our dispute with France by arbitration and to submit it to e Executive Council of the League of Nations for an expression of opinion. This will avert bloodshed in a country that has endured the woes of war from the beginning of the world conflict until the present day.
However, since the Great Powers had agreed secretly to divide among themselves the spoils of the former Ottoman Empire, particularly the Syrian region, that appeal went unheeded. Feisal, fortified by British advice not to reject the ultimatum, eagerly supported acceptance of its conditions. The following day, on July 19, 1920, he received the following telegram from Gouraud:
I have the honor to receive your letter sent through Colonel Toulat which mentioned your personal acceptance in principle of my conditions. May I remind your Royal Highness that the purpose of the note of July 14th was to gain not merely acceptance of the conditions, but their implementation by official measures enacted prior to the 18th and fully executed by midnight of the 31st.
Since I have already granted a 24-hour extension of the time limit at Your Highness' request, I would be justified in not g1 another until I receive urci of the official and actual acceptance by Your Highness of the measures referred to in paragraph 4 of the note of July 14th.
In order to give you sufficient time to accept the demands officially and to satisfy them, I have decided that my army will not move before midnight of July21st
The Battle of Maysalun
Not everyone in the Syrian Government shared Feisal's pessimistic outlook. Some even wanted to wage war to defend the country, including foremost the Minister of Defense, Yusuf Azmah. The mood inside the Government was documented by al-Husri:
All indications were that Damascus would become the primary military objective. Since the distance between this city and the French centers was extremely short, no more than 60 kilometers, the position of the Government would very quickly become untenable. I therefore suggested to my colleagues in the Cabinet that we move the treasury along with important documents to Dira' in anticipation of transferring the Government there too should the need arise. However, Ala' al-Din al-Durubi vehemently opposed my idea, saying: "You don't know the people of Hawran: by God they'll butcher us." He repeated this remark several times and passed his right hand over his left in imitation of the motions of slaughter. Each time I urged the step as a precautionary measure, I was greeted by al-Durubi's gesture. Since all the others, including Yusuf al-Azmah refused to take my proposal seriously, I decided not to insist.
Yusuf al-Azmah worked very energetically and with a show of great optimism. He even wanted to issue official communiqués on military developments. We objected and advised a delay in order to avoid creating the impression that we were initiating hostilities after we proclaimed to the world our readiness to submit our case to arbitration.
Yusuf concluded the necessary arrangements and then told us the names of the combat leaders. Mijdal Anjar, the most important front, was placed under the command of Emir Zaid with Yasin al-Hashimi as his chief of staff. Yasin had been interned by the British after the crisis over the evacuation. He was released two months later and returned to Damascus where I met him several times. Since the last occasion was more than a month ago, I thought it appropriate to visit him before his departure for the battlefield. I left his home utterly bewildered.
"Our army as it is now cannot defend the country." Yasin told me frankly and emphatically. "It cannot hold out against the enemy for more than two hours."
This statement flatly contradicted the spirit of optimism that radiated from Yusuf al-Azmah.
"Didn't you tell me at the time of the crisis over the replacement of the British troops that we could easily defend ourselves?" I asked.
"Yes, but the situation has changed radically since that date," he quickly replied. "The French have brought in reinforcements, whereas we have done practically nothing... The guns which passed before you during the parades... we have only a very small number of shells for them. They wouldn't be enough for a battle lasting over an hour. I can tell you that in case of regular warfare the army would be without ammunition in less than two hours."
As I left, confused and demoralized, I decided to call on Mustafa Nimah, a simple and well-intentioned man whom I got to know quite well during his service as Deputy Military Governor General. I asked his opinion of the military situation.
"We will fight when we are ordered to do so... without thinking about whether we will win or lose," he said calmly.
"But I should like to know," I cried, "if we have the matérial to carry on a serious war."
"The truth is we do not have enough," he answered with remarkable simplicity. "However, God, praise be to Him, will help by enabling us to capture supplies at the first clash between our forces. We will then fight the enemy with what we take from him, just as we did in the battles of Tripoli in North Africa."
I was shocked by what I heard because I fully realized that the battles to be fought in the mountains and on the plains of Syria could not be compared to those that took place on the shores and deserts of Tripoli.
Following this conversation I thought it my duty to have a frank talk with Yusuf al-Azmah. I reported Yasin's views and asked if they were based on fact.
Yusuf didn't conceal anything from me. "My dear friend," he answered in Turkish, "I was bluffing... to fool the French."
"But you see that things have passed the stage of bluff. We are now facing a real threat. Can we repel the enemy by force of arms?"
"If King Faisal had gone along with us from the beginning, we could have done something... but now..." he said sadly.
The Government accepted the Ultimatum on the afternoon of the 20th and adopted all the necessary measures to carry out the conditions, including the issuance of orders to demobilize the army. There were demonstrations in the streets of Damascus denouncing the Government, but to no avail.
It was now crystal clear that the French had not deviated one bit from the idea of occupying Damascus, despite Feisal acquiescence. The next morning the Syrian Government was startled by reports that the French army had marched from Shturah and Zahlah to Mijdal Anjar, Wadi al-Harir, and then moved on toward the capital without encountering any resistance because of the Syrian army's demobilization and withdrawal from Mijdal Anjar. At this point, records al-Husri, "Yusuf al-Azmah approached and whispered in my ear: "I am going to the front to do what I can to organize the troops, so please get me as much time as possible." I promised to do my best, bade him good-by, and went to King Faisal's room."
Despite last minute diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis peacefully, the French continued their march toward Damascus resolved to occupy Syria in toto. On 23 July, 1920, Gouraud sent another urgent telegram:
"Tell the Emir that my Chief of Staff will be at the W which has been established as a dividing line between the two armies, tomorrow at 6 o'clock to decide with the Emir's representative the question of the division's moving to a more suitable location. From the available intelligence it appears that the encampment must be set up at Khan Maysalun. Otherwise there is no change in the truce terms."
In other words, Gourand had added a new condition that would guarantee his troops unimpeded passage through the Wadi al-Zurziir and over the Maysalun foothills up to the abundant springs adjacent to the well known as Khan Maysalun. General Gouraud's obvious purpose was to bring his troops to within 25 kilometres of Damascus, wait for another opportunity to make a new demand, and then march them right into the heart of the capital. Al-Husri recalls:
As I was leaving the session, Yusuf al-Azmah, who had adjusted to the reality with great temperateness, came over to thank me for my success in extending the truce by an additional 24 hours. He said that he intended to exploit this gain to the maximum. He was doubtless aware that rejection of the conditions would lead to a clash destined to end in defeat, but he was resolved that it would be a glorious defeat."
While the politicians pondered their next move, "the decision to resist" had spread among the people. Yusuf Al-Azmah was one of the few ministers in the Government to side with the people: "Yusuf al-Azmah came in after supper to take leave of us before proceeding to the front. He walked with me to a corner of the room and said in Turkish in a tear-choked voice:
"I am going! I leave Leila in your care. Please don't forget her!"
Leila was his only daughter. She had come with her mother from Istanbul two weeks ago, i.e. just before the storm broke. I sensed at once what he meant.
He was going away resolved never to return. At this dreadful moment I didn't want to express any opinion whatsoever.
"I won't. You can be quite sure of that," I replied very calmly.
The beginning of July 24th was the time set for the expiration of the truce concluded with General Gouraud. It was expected that the French would first attack in the foothills at dawn. Details of the battle, which started at the predicted time, began to trickle back. Neither the soldiers nor weapons that were collected nor the fortifications were improvised proved able to withstand for more than a few hours the violent assault of a French army in possession of every conceivable weapon of destruction - heavy artillery, tanks, and airplanes. By 10 o'clock, word was received that the army had been defeated and the front shattered. Yusuf al-Azmah was reported to have been killed in true martyr fashion.
The Maysalun defeat marked the beginning of France's military occupation and mandate over Syria, including Lebanon, that would last a little over a quarter of a century. In conjunction with this a series of political events unfolded that would drive Syria further into darkness. To begin with, there was a major amputation when the country was partitioned between the French and British mandates in accordance with Sykes-Picot. The partition line passed south of Jebel Druze and the Hawran, leaving all the territory south of this line to Great Britain, which established the principality of Transjordan. Thus, this vast stretch of land which formed an integral part of Syria before Maysalun and of Ottoman Syria was detached by the two mandatory powers.
Secondly, on September 1, 1920 (i.e., almost 40 days after Maysalun) the French High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon, General Gouraud, proclaimed the formation of Greater Lebanon by annexing to the Lebanon of 1860 Beirut and Tripoli in the north, some districts of Tyre and Sidon in the south, and Baalbek, Biqaa, Rashiaya, and Hasbaya in the east. These four districts were an integral part of Syria before Maysalun, and General Gouraud detached them to enlarge Lebanon. The latter was formally separated from its Syrian interior and made a separate state. A week later, on September 8, 1920, the General created by another decree a new state in the north, the state of Aleppo, and on September 23, 1920, a new decree announced the birth of still another state, the "State of the Alawites." Several months later it was Jebel Druze turn to be detached. The list of political creations was complete with the addition of the sanjak of Alexandretta, which was endowed in 1921 with a special, almost autonomous, regime. Sati Husri later remarked: "What remained of Syria after the loss of its territories in the south, north, and west could no longer justify being called the "State of Syria." Hence it was christened the "State of Damascus." The very name of Syria was thus obliterated from this new political map."
Thirdly, after Maysalun, the democratically-elected Syrian Congress of 1919 lost its reason d'etre and disintegrated. King Feisal left the country ... The deputies of the Congress went separate ways: some left the country to agitate for its independence from abroad, some retired from politics, and some acquiesced in the new status quo. The division of Syria along those lines could not but stir up and intensify general discontent. The French mandate were naïve in thinking that all was going well and that everyone, except the Damascus politicians, was pleased with the new political map. The Aleppo elections of 1924 proved them wrong: after an absence of a little over three years, the name of the Syrian State was restored, and Damascus was recognized as its capital. Lebanon, though, was kept separate from Syria to appease the local Maronite community.
These political and territorial changes were preceded by economic measures intended to strengthen French control over the country.
(1) A new currency was introduced to steadily draw Syrian gold to the basement of the Bank of Syria and Lebanon and to enrich its stock holders at the expense of the Syrians.
(2) As soon as the military occupation began, the High Commissioner imposed an indemnity of 200,000 gold pounds on the Syrian government.
(3) The High Commissioner charged to the treasury of the Syrian states created after Maysalun the salaries and allowances of the French officials, civilian and military, whose numbers were to increase from day to day.
(4) The authorities of the Mandate heaped exceptional favors on French merchants and firms. And these favors naturally prevented the national economy from developing in a normal fashion.
These measures naturally could not but strengthen the protest and resistance movements which began with the start of the occupation in different parts of the country. These movements soon were organized both within the country and abroad. They latter formed a Syro-Palestinian Executive Committee, which convoked a Syro-Palestinian Congress at Geneva in order to be near the League of Nations and its Mandates Commission. According to Philip Khoury, however, "the Syrian-Palestinian Congress soon reproduced many of the same political divisions and regionalist tendencies that had already begun to surface among Syrian [nationalists]." Consequently, the Congress failed to develop into an organized movement and in the end it became an arena for a variety of personal disputes.
The Battle of Maysalun
The day Syria lost a battle and more
1. Sati al-Husri, The Day of Maysalun: A Page from the Modern History of the Arabs, Washington, D. C: The Middle East Institute, 1966.
2. Philip Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-1945, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1987, p. 444.
3. Zeine, Zeine N. The struggle for Arab independence: Western diplomacy and the Rise and Fall of Faisal's Kingdom in Syria, Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1977.
4. J.K. Tanenbaum, "France and the Arab Middle East," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 68, No. 7 (1978), 1-50.
George Kirk, Short History of the Middle East. 5th edition. New York: Praeger, 1959.
A. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay. Beirut: Librairie Du Liban, 1968.
G. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs. 3rd Ed., Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1962.